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I Have a Conscience, Too: The Plight of Medical
Personnel Confronting the Right to Die
Issues underlying a person's so-called "right to die" are numerous'
and continue to be heatedly debated. 2 While some courts have found a
right to die, the Supreme Court previously declined to address the issue
until recently.3 The Court will decide its first "right to die" case, Cruzan
v. Harmon,4 this term.
Nancy Cruzan is in her early thirties at the time of this writing and
lies in a persistent vegetative state.5 She is not dead, nor terminally ill.
According to medical experts, she could live another thirty years. Her
I Legal, medical and ethical questions in this area include, but are certainly not limited to, those
addressing the definition of death itself; living wills; "ordinary" versus "extraordinary" means of
sustaining life; under what circumstances a person can refuse medical treatment; and who should
decide whether an incompetent patient should have various medical treatments withheld. See, e.g.,
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH (U.S.G.P.O., March, 1983)(Commission members reported about various
ethical issues in biomedicine-some reports directly addressed right-to-die issues), specifically,
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, (U.S.G.P.O. March,
1983) [hereinafter the PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT]. See also Miles, Singer & Siegler, Conflicts
Between Patients' Wishes to Forgo Treatment and the Policies of Health Care Facilities, 321 NEw ENG. J. MED.
48 (1989) (Three doctors voice concern over three recent cases in which courts held that a patient's
right to refuse nutrition is paramount to the rights of the objecting institution and its staff); infra note
2.
2 See, e.g., Note, Someone Make Up My Mind: The Troubling Right to Die Issues Presented by Incompetent
Patients with No Prior Expression of a Treatment Preference, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 394 (1989), which
discusses the foundations upon which the right to refuse medical treatment has been granted; the
approaches courts use to determine when treatment may be refused, especially by incompetents
unable to decide for themselves; and who should make such decisions when the patient cannot do so.
See also, Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983); Brophy v. New
England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986); Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408
(Mo. 1988) (en banc), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989); In re Farrell, 108 NJ. 335, 529 A.2d 404
(1987); In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987); In reJobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434, stay
denied sub nom. Lincoln Park Nursing and Convalescent Home v. Kahn, 483 U.S. 1036 (1987); In re
Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985); In re Quinlan, 70 NJ. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429
U.S. 922 (1976); Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1988).
3 See Note, supra note 2, at 399 n.22 (The United States Supreme Court previously declined to
address the right-to-die issue).
4 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989).
5 Dr. Fred Plum, Profeisbr and Chairman of the Department of Neuiology at Cornell coined
the phrase "persistent vegetative state" used in Quinlan andJobes. During theJobes trial he explained
that:
Vegetative state describes a body which is functioning entirely in terms of its internal con-
trols. It maintains temperature. It maintains heart beat and pulmonary ventilation. It
maintains digestive activity. It maintains reflex activity of muscles and nerves for low level
conditioned responses. But there is no behavioral evidence of either self-awareness or
awareness of the surroundings in a learned manner.
Jobes, 529 A.2d at 438. See also Brophy, 497 N.E.2d at 628 n.4:
A physician who performed a neurological evaluation of Brophy testified that a persistent
vegetative state is a condition in which the patient:
"(a) shows no evidence of verbal or non-verbal communication;
"(b) demonstrates no purposeful movement or motor ability;
"(c) is unable to interact purposely with stimulation provided by his environment;
"(d) is unable to provide for his own basic needs;
"(e) demonstrates all of the above for longer than three months."
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parents and co-guardians requested that Mount Vernon State Hospital
employees discontinue Nancy's artificial hydration and nutrition. A Mis-
souri trial court found that, "to the extent that [Missouri law] . . . set
forth a public policy of the General Assembly prohibiting the withhold-
ing and withdrawal of nutrition and hydration under all circumstances
S. . [it] violate[d] Nancy Cruzan's right to liberty, due process of law and
equal protection under the state and federal constitutions. ' 6
The lower court directed Missouri state employees to "cause the re-
quest of the co-guardians to withdraw nutrition or hydration to be car-
ried out."' 7 In reversing the trial court holding, the Missouri Supreme
Court found that the "trial court erroneously declared the law" gov-
erning the case's single issue: "May a guardian order that all nutrition
and hydration be withheld from an incompetent ward who is in a persis-
tent vegetative state, who is neither dead within the meaning of [Missouri
law]8 , nor terminally ill?" 9
The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the co-guardians could
not order state employees to withdraw hydration and nutrition. The co-
guardians did not have the authority to do so. The court considered the
evidence regarding Nancy Cruzan's wishes to be "unreliable and thus
insufficient to support the co-guardians [sic] claim to exercise substituted
judgment on Nancy's behalf."10 The court found that the emotional bur-
This definition is consistent with the description of a persistent vegetative state in the
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, which also states:
Most of what makes someone a distinctive individual is lost when the person is
unconscious, especially if he or she will always remain so. Personality, memory,
purposive action, social interaction, sentience, thought, and even emotional states
are gone. Only vegetative functions and reflexes persist. If food is supplied, the
digestive system functions, and uncontrolled evacuation occurs; the kidneys pro-
duce urine; the heart, lungs, and blood vessels continue to move air and blood;
and nutrients are distributed in the body. (Footnote omitted.)
Id. (citing PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 174-75 (1983).
6 760 S.W.2d at 410-11.
7 Id. at 410.
8 Under Missouri law:
For all legal purposes, the occurrence of human death shall be determined in accordance
with the usual and customary standards of medical practice, provided that death shall not
be determined to have occurred unless the following minimal conditions have been met:
(1) When respiration and circulation are not artificially maintained, there is an irrevers-
ible cessation of spontaneous respiration and circulation; or
(2) When respiration and circulation are artificially maintained, and there is total and
irreversible cessation of all brain function, including the brain stem and that such determi-
nation is made by a licensed physician.
Id. at 411 n.3 (citing Mo. REV. STAT. § 194.005 (1986)).
9 Id. at 410. The Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act (URITA) defines a "terminal condi-
tion" as "an incurable or irreversible condition that, without the administration of life-sustaining
treatment, will, in the opinion of the attending physician, result in death within a relatively short
time." Id. at 420 (citing URITA § 1 (9)). It defines "life-sustaining treatment" as "any medical
procedure or intervention that, when administered to a qualified patient, will serve only to prolong
the dying process." Id. at 419 (citing URITA § I(4)). It is unsettled whether artificial hydration and
nutrition are medical treatments. Id. at 423.
Missouri based its definitions on URITA. Missouri defines a "terminal condition" as "an incur-
able or irreversible condition which.., is such that a death will occur within a short time regardless
of the application of medical procedures." Id. at 420 (citing Mo. REV. STAT. § 459.010 (6) (1986)).
10 Id. at 426. When a patient does not have the capacity to make his own treatment decision the
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT and other sources recommend that a surrogate be named. The
surrogate and health care providers then decide for the patient. There are two standards for this
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den of supplying hydration and nutrition was heavy on the family, but
that the G-tube was not substantially burdensome for Nancy Cruzan. 11
The court also emphasized that the state has an interest in preserving
life, not just Nancy Cruzan's life, but the lives of those in similar circum-
stances who may not have a supporting, loving family. The court con-
cluded that the state's interest in preserving life outweighed any right
asserted on Nancy's behalf to stop providing food and water.12
This Note will not directly address the "single issue" Cruzan raises.
Rather, it argues that Cruzan and cases like it present a fundamental issue
that courts have thus far failed to fully address: whether a court may com-
pel medical personnel to terminate artificial nutrition and hydration even
though they are opposed for ethical reasons. Cruzan's parents and co-
guardians asked the hospital to remove her feeding tube. Hospital em-
ployees refused to comply without authority from a court.13 The Cruzan
court stated that this case "is a case in which [they] are asked to allow the
medical profession to make Nancy die by starvation and dehydration." 1 4
This Note contends that some cases result in court orders which do not
merely "allow the medical profession to make [someone] die"' 5 , but they in
fact make the medical profession make someone die.
This Note addresses the medical professional's right to refrain from
participating in such acts for ethical reasons.16 Part I focuses on a Rhode
Island case, Gray v. Romeo, 17 to illustrate the problem. In Gray, the Fed-
eral District Court of Rhode Island ordered a hospital to terminate artifi-
decisionmaking: "substituted judgment" and "best interests" methods. Under substituted judg-
ment, the surrogate decision-makers attempt to decide what decision the incapacitated person would
make if able to do so. Therefore, the patient's definition of well-being is considered. This is the
subjective approach. To use this standard, the patient must have been capable of having views relat-
ing to his present condition and there must be reliable evidence of those views. The best evidence
would be past expressions of those views. Written statements are preferred to oral ones. See PRESI-
DENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 44-45, 132-34.
The best interests standard is a more objective approach, generally used when the substituted
judgment approach cannot be used. This usually happens when there is no reliable evidence of an
incapacitated patient's views on the subject or treatment at hand. Surrogates then try to determine
what would be in the patient's best interest, considering numerous factors. Id. at 134-36. See also,
Mooney, Deciding Not to Resuscitate Hospital Patients: Medical and Legal Perspectives, 1986 U. ILL. L. REv.
1025, 1079-80 n.341 (1986) (discusses how to determine whether a patient is incompetent) and see
Note, supra note 2, (addressing surrogate decisionmaking for incompetents).
According to In re Conroy, these two standards form three tests to determine whether to with-
draw treatment. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d 408, 415 (citing In re Conroy, 98 NJ. 321, 486 A.2d 1209
(1985)).
11 The court states that continued feeding through the tube is not invasive nor is it painful. It is
not burdensome to Nancy. 760 S.W.2d at 423-24.
12 Id. Based on earlier cases, namely In reJobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434, stay denied sub nom.
Lincoln Park Nursing and Convalescent Home v. Kahn, 483 U.S. 1036 (1987), and In re Conroy, 98
NJ. 321. 486 A.2d 1209 (1985), informal reactions to other people's medical condition and care are
not clear and convincing proof of what a patient would decide for himself. Therefore, Nancy's infor-
mal comments regarding Karen Quinlan are insufficient proof of what Nancy Cruzan would want if
she were competent. 760 S.W.2d at 424.
13 760 S.W.2d at 410.
14 Id at 412. See infra note 27.
15 760 S.W.2d at 412 (emphasis added).
16 There is a debate about whether these acts are in fact euthanasia. Euthanasia is an "act or
method of causing death painlessly, so as to end suffering; advocated by some as a way to deal with
victims of incurable diseases." WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 631 (1986 una-
bridged). There is argument over what actions constitute euthanasia.
17 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1988).
1990)
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cial hydration and nutrition if it could not promptly transfer the patient
to a hospital that would do so. Part II explains the dying process that
occurs after medical staff remove the tubes supplying the patient's hydra-
tion and nutrition. Part III discusses the federal legislation protecting
medical personnel who refuse to perform abortions and sterilization pro-
cedures and whether there is a need for similar state and federal con-
science clauses in this area of the law. Part IV then recommends that
Congress and state legislatures enact conscience clauses protecting med-
ical personnel.
I. Gray v. Romeo: Can a Court Order Medical Professionals to
Terminate Hydration and Nutrition?
A. Facts and Holding in Gray v. Romeo
1. Facts of Gray v. Romeo
Marcia Gray was born in April, 1939. She married Glenn Gray in
1961. The couple had two children, Brian and Karen, both in their twen-
ties at the time of the litigation.18 Marcia's relatives and friends por-
trayed her as an "active, vibrant and very happy woman"' 19 who exercised
regularly and was rarely ill.20
While shopping with her husband on January 4, 1986, she suffered a
major cerebral hemorrhage which began as a "sudden and severe head-
ache with serious pain." 21 She was rushed to South County Hospital.
She lost consciousness and was transferred to Rhode Island Hospital. 22
She underwent numerous surgeries with her family's consent, including
an emergency surgery to save her life shortly after her transfer to Rhode
Island Hospital. 23 Doctors also performed a gastrostomy, better known
as inserting a "G-tube" for hydration and nutrition.24 On July 24, 1986,
18 Id. at 581.
19 Id. at 582.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id. Marcia Gray went from "an alert, normal neurological state to a comatose state within
approximately two to three hours after the onset of the headache." Joint Stipulation of Facts at 2,
Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1988) (No. 87-0573B) [hereinafter Joint Stipulation of
Facts].
At Rhode Island Hospital, doctors diagnosed cerebral hemorrhages-subarachnoid, subdural,
and right infratemporal lobe hemorrhages.
In lay terms, this means that a blood vessel in the brain had burst and blood was being
pumped into the brain matter, permanently destroying large parts of the brain. Among
other brain-related activities, she lost all intellectual cognitive functions and almost all mo-
tor functions. The autonomous nervous system, which controls the functioning of the
heart, lungs, digestive system, and other organic functions, is the only system which still
functions, and even that operates only partially.
Id. at 2.
23 697 F. Supp. at 582. At Rhode Island Hospital, she "underwent an emergency operation,
including a right frontotemporal craniotomy with evacuation of the subdural and infratemporal lobe
hematomas and clipping of the cerebral artery aneurysm. In lay terms, this means that her skull was
opened surgically and large blood clots were removed, as was part of her cranium." Joint Stipula-
tion of Facts, supra note 22, at 3.
24 697 F. Supp. at 582. On January 16, 1986, her husband consented to a gastrostomy "which
involved the creation of a hole in the abdominal wall and into the stomach through which a tube (G-
tube) is inserted by which nutrition and hydration may be directly provided to the stomach. Also, an
endotracheal tube was inserted in her trachea for the purpose of removing mucus." Id. On Febru-
[Vol. 65:699
Marcia was transferred to Rhode Island Medical Center, General Hospi-
tal ("Medical Center").25 She never regained consciousness and was in a
persistent vegetative state at the time of litigation. It was unclear
whether Marcia experienced pain. 26
Every four hours medical staff fed Marcia a liquid formula and inter-
mittently administered water through the G-tube. In May, 1987, Marcia's
family asked that her doctor order the feeding stopped "and that Marcia
Gray be permitted to die."' 27 At the time, doctors agreed on the progno-
sis--"no 'reasonable likelihood of returning to a conscious state' and
that there is 'no chance' of Marcia Gray's recovery." '28
Her neurosurgeon said he did not believe she would experience
hunger, thirst or pain should the feeding be discontinued. 29 But, the
parties stipulated that she reacted to some pain.30 Marcia's family, con-
sisting of her husband, two children, her mother, and sister-in-law, were
"convinced that it would be [Marcia's] desire not to be sustained with
ary 6, 1986, doctors surgically inserted a shunt to drain excessive cerebrospinal fluids from the brain
and have performed four other procedures between February and June of 1986, to repair shunt
malfunctions. Doctors also removed her infected cranial bone plate. Id.
25 Id.
26 l,
The court-appointed Guardian Ad Litem described Mrs. Gray's condition at the time of the
litigation. The Gray opinion quoted the Guardian Ad Litem's opinion:
Marcia Gray has been diagnosed as being in "persistent vegetative state" (PVS). PVS is a
type of comatose state in which the cerebral functioning has ceased but in which the brain
stem functioning is fully or partially intact. The brain stem controls primitive reflexes, in-
cluding heart activity, breathing, the sleep/wake cycle, reflexive activity in upper and lower
extremities, some swallowing motions and eye movements. Marcia shows signs of each of
these activities. The cerebrum, on the other hand, controls sensation and voluntary and
conscious activities. Marcia's cerebrum has been damaged severely, and as a result she
displays no voluntary or conscious movements, nor does she display any awareness or sensation.
This combination of reflexive activity in the absence of sensation or conscious activity is
characteristic of PVS. PVS is generally a permanent condition.
Id (emphasis added).
However, the parties stipulated that Marcia Gray had some reaction to pain. Thejoint Stipula-
tion of Facts described her condition at the time of litigation:
Postoperatively she never regained consciousness and has remained in a "persistent vegeta-
tive state." (hereinafter referred to as "PVS.") PVS is a term that defines a long-term con-
dition, at least one year, where the patient is not aware of her surroundings, where there is
no communication with others, ard where there is no hope of recovery. There are no con-
sistent recognizable cognitive functions. Some reflexes are still present, and Mrs. Gray has
some motion, which is probably involuntary, such as the occasional movement of the head.
Some reaction to pain has been noted. The pupils will constrict if light is shined on them.
Joint Stipulation of Facts, supra note 22, at 3 (emphasis added).
27 697 F. Supp. at 583. Compare with Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 412 (Mo. 1988) (en
banc) cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989). In Cruzan, Nancy Cruzan was also in a persistent vegeta-
tive state and was not terminally ill or dying. The family also requested medical personnel to discon-
tinue all nutrition and hydration. The Supreme Court of Missouri stated that Cruzan was:
[A] case in which euphemisms readily find their way to the fore, perhaps to soften the reality
of what is really at stake. But this is not a case in which we are asked to let someone die.
Nancy is not dead. Nor is she terminally ill. This is a case in which we are asked to allow
the medical profession to make Nancy die by starvation and dehydration.
28 697 F. Supp. at 583. Family members mentioned various conversations they had with Nancy
regarding Karen Quinlan's situation. Mr. Gray said his wife made him promise not to keep her alive
by artificial means if she were ever in a similar condition. Id. Note, however, that Karen Quinlan's
family was not asking the hospital to remove Karen's feeding tube. See infra note 32.
29 697 F. Supp. at 583. But see supra note 26.
30 See supra note 26.
1990] NOTES
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
artificial measures if her life were otherwise hopeless." 31 They reported
conversations Marcia previously had with various family members in
which she criticized keeping Karen Ann Quinlan alive by artificial
means .32
The Medical Center denied the family's request. "The staff and ad-
ministration refused to honor this request because they felt to do so
would be a violation of their ethical and professional duties and responsi-
bilities."3 3 While the Medical Center gave permission to transfer Marcia
elsewhere, the family did not transfer her prior to the litigation because
they feared criminal prosecution. Moreover, they had not found a
nearby facility that would agree to accept Marcia and terminate her nu-
trition and hydration without some assurance that the facility's staff and
administration would not face criminal prosecution.34
Marcia could not receive food or liquids orally. Her G-tube pro-
duced little, if any, discomfort. While no one could accurately predict
how long she would survive without food and water, the litigants stipu-
lated that it would be improbable for her to survive longer than twenty
days. They also stipulated that medical experts would testify either that,
in their opinion, Marcia would not suffer or that it would be impossible
to tell if she would experience pain or suffering. No known medical ex-
perts would testify that, in their opinion, she would experience pain or
suffering. 35 However, the parties did stipulate that she had reacted to
pain. 36
2. Objections to Removing Hydration and Nutrition
In their stipulation of facts, the parties outlined four reasons why the
medical facility objected to terminating Marcia's hydration and nutrition.
The first reason was that the Medical Center and the Director of the De-
partment of Mental Health, Retardation and Hospitals, ethically oppose
"any procedure which will actively cause death, including cessation of
treatment."3 7 The facility's philosophy and documented missions are to
"heal illness and maintain life." 38 Since Marcia had a long life expec-
tancy and was not dying, the institution, staff and defendants believed
31 697 F. Supp. at 583. See supra note 26 and infra notes 49 and 130.
32 697 F. Supp. at 583. The Cruzan court noted, however, that in In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355
A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976), Karen Quinlan's father sought a court order to disconnect
her respirator, not her hydration and nutrition. "When asked if he wanted Karen's nasogastric feed-
ing tube removed, Mr. Quinlan replied, 'Oh no, that is her nourishment.'" Cruzan v. Harmon, 760
S.W.2d 408, 413 & n.7 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989)(citing Ramsey,
Prolonged Dying: Not Medically Indicated, 6 HASTINGS CENT. REP. 14 (1976)).
33 Joint Stipulation of Facts, supra note 22, at 5.
34 Id. at 6. See also Gould, Right to Die Legislation : The Effect on Physicians' Liability, 39 MERCER L.
REV. 517 (1988) for a discussion of physicians' criminal and civil liabilities and protections from
liability.
35 Joint Stipulation of Facts, supra note 22, at 7-8.
36 See supra note 26.
37 Joint Stipulation of Facts, supra note 22, at 8-9.
38 Id. at 9. The Medical Center and its director "object to any procedure which will actively
cause death, including cessation of treatment." Id. With continued nutrition, Marcia Gray could live
a long life; without nutrition, she would not die directly from her illness, but she would starve to
death or dehydrate.
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that Marcia's family was asking them to perform euthanasia by requesting
that they remove the tube.3 9
Second, the Medical Center argued that, if the Center voluntarily
complied with the Gray family's request, it would perpetuate the fear of
the Center's predominantly geriatric population and their families that
the facility would begin carrying out these requests routinely. 40 Third,
the Medical Center was concerned that without court review, staff might
lose their licenses and the facility or its staff might be civilly or criminally
prosecuted for taking Marcia's life.4 1 The Medical Center found no legal
standards or guidance for issues such as how to decide to stop various
treatments, who may decide to stop such treatments, and whether an in-
stitution can be compelled to stop such treatments. 42 .
Lastly, the Medical Center was concerned that Marcia's rights may
not be fully protected. She had left no clear, written instructions as to
her wishes. The Medical Center found no guidance on how to fully and
fairly protect a patient's right to life in these situations. Neither the
courts nor the Rhode Island legislature provide any assistance in these
cases. Therefore, the Medical Center decided that it would be improper
to grant the family's request until a court properly decided the related
issues.43
The court stated that the Medical Center would not terminate Mar-
cia's nutrition and hydration because to do so constitutes euthanasia, is
"inconsistent with the physician's role as safekeeper of his or her pa-
tient's well being," 44 could pose civil or criminal liability, and would
damage the hospital's reputation as an institution devoted to long-term
care.45 Moreover, defendants argued that continuing hydration and nu-
trition violated no constitutional rights. In fact, they argued that it is
illegal to withhold food and water from a persistently vegetative patient.
The Medical Center also posited a right to protect its patient's interests
as well as its health care personnel's interests. The Medical Center con-
tended that the court cannot direct it and its personnel to perform the
procedure since its personnel object to it.46 The medical professionals
were "unanimous in their adamant opposition to the proposal to remove
nutrition and hydration."47
3. Reasons the Family Wanted to Remove Hydration and Nutrition
The Gray family believed that Marcia would not want to remain alive
under the present circumstances and would want her hydration and nu-
39 Id See also supra note 16 regarding euthanasia.
40 Joint Stipulation of Facts, supra note 22, at 9.
41 Id. at 10. Medical Center officials noted that in at least one state, California, two doctors were
charged with murder for participating in a procedure similar to that in the Gray case. Charges were
eventually dropped. The Stipulation of Facts does not provide any citation for this fact. See also,
Gould, supra note 34.
42 Joint Stipulation of Facts, supra note 22, at 10.
43 Id. at 10-11.
44 697 F. Supp. at 583.
45 Id.
46 Id at 583-84.
47 Id. at 583.
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trition discontinued. The family, through Mr. Gray, argued that under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Civil Rights Act of 1871,48 Mr. Romeo, in his ca-
pacity as Director of the Department of Mental Health, Retardation and
Hospitals, and the State of Rhode Island denied Marcia her constitu-
tional rights. The family sought a declaratory judgment authorizing the
guardian, Mr. Gray, to "require the withdrawal of the life support
apparatus."49
Further, Mr. Gray complained that his wife's first, ninth, and four-
teenth amendment rights would be denied if he were not authorized to
"order" medical personnel to remove the G-tube.50 Various family
members commented that Marcia made statements conveying her wishes
not to be kept alive by artificial means.51
4. The Court's Analysis
The court objected to categorizing this as a right to die case. 52 In-
stead, the court said the case was more about "life and circumstances. '5 3
48 Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
49 697 F. Supp. at 583 (emphasis added). It is not clear whether a feeding tube should be
treated differently from other types of "life support apparatus." In the law of living wills, for exam-
ple, provision of hydration and nutrition is distinguished from other forms of "life support appara-
tus" and many state statutes do not allow living wills to address removing hydration and nutrition.
See Mooney, Indiana's Living Wills and Life-Prolonging Procedures Act: A Reform Proposal, 20 IND. L. REV.
539, 544. But cf., AMA' s Statement on Withdrawing Treatment, USA Today, Apr. 2, 1986, at 9A, construed
in Note, Comparison of the Living Will Statutes of the Fifty States, 14J. CoN-rEMP. L. 105, 121 (1988). The
American Medical Association's Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs issued a March 17, 1986
statement that: "Life-prolonging medical treatment includes medication and artificially or techno-
logically supplied respiration, nutrition or hydration." Id. The Note reports that in 19 states life-
support does not include nourishment. Id. app. at 123-29.
50 Complaint at 1 & 6, Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1988) (No. 87-0573B).
The first amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press;
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for redress of
grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
The ninth amendment states: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONsT. amend. IX.
The fourteenth amendment provides in part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
51 697 F. Supp. at 583. See supra note 49 for a discussion of the definition of artificial means of
life support. See also supra note 28 referencing Marcia's conversations with family members about
Karen Quinlan's circumstances.
52 697 F. Supp. at 584. "Although it has been customary to cast actions such as this in the light
of raising the issue of a right to die this shorthand expression does not in any sense communicate
effectively the nature of this controversy." Id.
53 Id. The court adopted a typical utilitarian approach to legal issues with a pleasure vs. pain
analysis-a quality of life argument.
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It framed the issue as "whether or not the State can insist that a person in
a vegetative state incapable of intelligent sensation, whose condition is
irreversible, may be required to submit to medical care under circum-
stances in which the patient prefers not to do so."' 54 Restated, "the ques-
tion is who has the right to determine [Maria's] course of care." 55
To answer this question the court broke down its analysis into five
issues. The first was whether Marcia had a constitutional right to refuse
life-sustaining medical treatment;56 the second was whether feeding and
hydrating through a G-tube is medical treatment.57 After answering
these affirmatively, the court next looked at evidence to help determine
Due to advances in medical care, it is possible in some circumstances to sustain the body's
biological functions for extended ieri6ds of time while the patient has no sense of pain or
pleasure, fear or joy, love or hate, understanding or appreciation, taste or touch or smell or
any other aspect of life's experience, with no realistic possibility of sentient life.
Id See also Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626, 633 (1986). The
court stated that "the right of self-determination and individual autonomy has its roots deep in our
history," and quoting John Stuart Mill:
[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a
civilised [sic] community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good,
either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do
or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier,
because, in the opinion of others, to do so would be wise, or even right.
Id (citations omitted).
The Brophy court used this quote as a foundation for a patient's autonomy. This philosophy
maintains that a patient should be free to refuse even life-sustaining treatment as long as it does not
harm others. As long as another's rights are not infringed the state should not be paternalistic and
decide what one ought to do for his own good, according to Mill.
But arguably, ordering medical staff to terminate artificial feeding is infringing on someone
else's rights. In fact, maintaining the nutrition may create the least amount of harm in the Gray case
since Marcia experienced no discomfort and there is always the slight chance that future medical
technology could bring her out of her state. See infra note 130. Therefore, the state cannot compel
medical personnel to terminate this care. The state must protect the health provider's autonomy as
well as a patient's. This Note contends that when applying utilitarian theory, the outcome depends
completely on the definition of harm.
The Brophy court acknowledged a right to personal autonomy, but then found that compelling
medical staff to act against their moral and ethical principles was wholly inappropriate. The court
did not cite Mill in this part of its opinion, however, so we do not know what jurisprudence led to its
conclusion.
St. Thomas Aquinas would have also refrained from compelling medical staff to act against their
ethical principles, but he would not have used the utilitarian principles for any part of his analysis.
Aquinas had stated that laws are either just or unjust. Ifjust, they can bind a person's conscience.
Laws can be unjust in two ways: "by being contrary to human good" or "being opposed to the
Divine good." T. AQUINAS, TRFATISE ON Law, 96-97 (Gateway ed. 1988). Unjust laws do not bind
one's conscience and those opposing the Divine Good "must no wise be observed, because... we
ought to obey God rather than man." Id. at 97.
One could argue that a court order compelling a nurse to withdraw a patient's feeding tube, for
example, might be unjust on both counts. It arguably contradicts human good because it exceeds
the lawgiver's (the court's) power. Generally, a court cannot force someone to act against his moral
or ethical fiber without a compelling state interest. To do so may directly violate the fourteenth and
first amendments. Obeying the court order may prohibit some nurses from exercising their religion,
if the medical procedure goes against one's religiously-based convictions. Id See infra notes 148-189
and accompanying text.
Arguably, the court would also violate Divine law by compelling someone to contravene Divine
law, assuming withholding food and water would violate someone's religiously-based convictions. A
person ought to obey God over man. T. AQUINAS, supra, at 97. See also infra notes 150 & 173-178 and
accompanying text for a discussion of what is necessary for a free exercise violation.
54 697 F. Supp. at 584.
55 Id.
56 Id
57 Id at 586.
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what Marcia's wishes would be. 58 This third analytical step led the court
to find that Marcia would refuse this treatment if competent.59 The
court's fourth issue was whether any governmental interests outweighed
Marcia's interest.60 Finding none overriding, the court looked at its fifth
and final issue, whether the court should and could require the Rhode
Island Medical Center and its personnel to remove the G-tube.6'
This Note focuses on the final issue alone. Nonetheless, reviewing
the court's analysis will provide a framework for considering the health
care provider's dilemma.
a. Is there "a federal constitutional right to refuse life-sustaining medical
treatment?"62
The court concluded that even though the United States Supreme
Court had never addressed this issue, its decisions under the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause or other constitutional penumbras
could be applied here. 63 The court cited Roe v. Wade,64 which found a
"right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's
concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action ... or ... in
the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people . . .broad
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate
her pregnancy." 65 The court applied Roe and its progeny, asserting the
general personal autonomy principle. 66 The court also referred to Gris-
wold v. Connecticut,67 where the Supreme Court originally established a
right to privacy based on the penumbras of the Constitution.68
58 Id. at 587.
59 Id. at 588.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 590.
62 Id. at 584. It would be possible for the Supreme Court to decide, in Cruzan, that there is a
right to die but it is based in a common law right of personal autonomy and not in a constitutional
right to privacy. See infra note 121.
63 697 F. Supp. at 584.
64 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See also Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S.Ct. 3040 (1989).
65 410 U.S. at 153. Note that the Court held that the fetus did not have constitutional rights,
denying it personhood status under the Constitution. Id. at 157.
Note also that the woman's "rights" were not absolute, but subject to limitation by a compelling
state interest. While the Court found protecting potential life to be a state interest, it held that this
interest does not become "compelling" enough for a state to proscribe abortion till viability, when a
fetus could live outside the womb. Id. at 155.
66 697 F. Supp. at 585. The court referred to Roe's progeny up to the time of the case, thus
excluding Webster, but including Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 462
U.S. 416 (1983), and Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747 (1986).
In 1973, in Roe v. Wade, the Court affirmed the principle that a person has the right,
grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause, to control fundamental deci-
sions involving his or her own body. The Court noted, of course, that this right of privacy is
not absolute, but must be balanced against certain state interests.
697 F. Supp. at 585.
67 381 U.S. 479 (1965). This case established a right to privacy in the marital bedroom regarding
contraceptives. Id. The Court has expanded this "right to privacy" beyond the marital bedroom. In
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), the Court found it unconstitutional for states to proscribe
selling contraceptives to single persons. The Court broadened the right to include abortion cases
beginning with Roe, but refused to apply it to consensual homosexual activity in Bowers v. Hard-
wick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
68 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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The Gray court acknowledged that the Supreme Court recently re-
fused to expand the privacy right in Bowers v. Hardwick,69 a case involving
consensual homosexual activity. Nonetheless, the Gray court expanded
the privacy right to include refusing medical treatment even if it results
in the individual's death. The court found the Gray family's facts more
closely akin to Roe and Griswold than to Bowers.70
The court also found support for its finding in the Bowers opinion
itself. In Bowers, the Supreme Court stated the right to privacy included
personal decisions "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" 71 or
"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition. ' 72 Finally, the Gray
court relied on Tune v. Walter Reed Army Medical Hospital,73 to conclude
that a person " 'has a paramount right to control the disposition to be
made of his or her body, absent a compelling countervailing governmen-
tal interest,' even if the decision results in that person's death." 74
b. Is nutrition and hydration provided through a G-tube medical treatment?
The court acknowledged an "emotional symbolism" attributed to
nutrition, but found no legal distinction between providing respiration
or nutrition through a tube. Since other cases defined artificial respira-
tion as medical treatment, the court concluded that Marcia's right to re-
fuse medical treatment included removing a G-tube.75
c. Would Marcia Gray have refused the G-tube if she were competent?
The Gray court stated that "the right to refuse medical treatment
'must extend to the case of an incompetent, as well as a competent, pa-
tient because the value of human dignity extends to both.' "76 The court
briefly discussed the substituted judgment doctrine, under which a court
decides what an incompetent person may have wanted if he were compe-
tent to make his own decision. 77 For the court, the evidence clearly re-
vealed that if competent, Marcia would refuse this medical treatment.78
Thus, it found no need to decide how a substituted judgment would be
made since the court said all involved were in agreement including the
court. In this part of its opinion, the court disregarded the fact that the
69 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
70 697 F. Supp. at 585-86.
71 478 U.S. at 191 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
72 Id at 192 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
73 602 F. Supp. 1452 (D.D.C. 1985).
74 697 F. Supp. at 586 (quoting Tune v. Walter Reed Army Medical Hosp., 602 F. Supp. 1452,
1454 (D.D.C. 1985)).
75 Id at 587. The court relied generally on Lincoln Park Nursing and Convalescent Home v.
Kahn, 483 U.S. 1036 (1987); In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947 (Me. 1987); and Brophy v. New England
Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986). The court more specifically cited Tune, 602 F.
Supp. at 1455-56 for this proposition.
76 697 F. Supp. at 587 (quoting Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 431, 497
N.E. 2d 626, 634 (1986) (quoting Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373
Mass. 728, 745, 370 N.E.2d 417, 427 (1977))).
77 Id See supra note 10 for discussion of substituted judgment. See also infra note 130 for cases in
which physicians were wrong regarding a patient's diagnosis.
78 697 F. Supp. at 587. Note, however, that the hospital continued objecting to withdrawing the
G-tuhe.
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Medical Center and its personnel continuously opposed withdrawing the
tube.
d. Does Marcia Gray s self-determination interest outweigh state interests?
Roe v. Wade 79 and Webster v. Reproductive Health Services 80 emphasized
that individual rights are not absolute. The Gray court balanced Marcia's
rights against the state interests of preserving life, preventing suicide,
protecting innocent third parties and maintaining the integrity of medical
ethics.81 It concluded that none of the government's interests out-
weighed Marcia's interest. The Gray court referred to Brophy v. New Eng-
land Sinai Hospital8 2 in analyzing this issue. The Brophy court found that
the state's duty "to preserve life must encompass a recognition of an in-
dividual's right to avoid circumstances in which the individual himself
would feel that efforts to sustain life demean or degrade his humanity." 83
Brophy also held that a state should not decide questions regarding a per-
son's quality of life; the person should make those decisions.8 4 Applying
Brophy, the Gray court decided that Marcia would find the G-tube
demeaning.8 5
Gray also disregarded the ordinary/extraordinary treatment distinc-
tion sometimes used to balance state and individual interests.8 6 Under
this distinction, treatment categorized as ordinary could not be withheld
while extraordinary treatment could ethically be withheld.8 7 Moreover,
the court concluded that Marcia did not need state protection since her
family was there "working for her interest."8 8 Other incapacitated pa-
tients need state protection because they are unable to protect their own
interests and have no one to do so.
Preventing suicide, the second state interest, also failed to outweigh
Marcia's rights. The court distinguished suicide or self-infliction from
self-determination, finding that suicide is "deliberately ending a life by
artificial means" while self-determination is "allowing nature to take its
course." 89 The court acknowledged, nonetheless, that upon withdrawing
nutrition and hydration, Marcia would die directly of starvation and de-
79 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
80 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
81 697 F. Supp. at 588 (relying upon Tune v. Waiter Reed Army Medical Hosp., 602 F. Supp.
1452, 1455 (D.D.C. 1985)).
82 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986).
83 697 F. Supp. at 588.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 588-89. See infra note 87.
87 In Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986), the court
noted that in In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), the Quinlan court found the distinction
between ordinary and extraordinary care to be significant. 497 N.E.2d at 637. More recent cases
have stopped using the distinction. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 82-83.
The distinction is "both difficult and controversial and [it] can lead to inconsistent results, which
makes the terms of questionable value in the formulation of public policy in this area." Id at 83.
The distinction originally marked the difference between ordinary treatment that the patient was
morally obligated to accept and others to provide, and extraordinary treatment that was optional by
moral standards. Id. at 82.




hydration. 90 The court still found a difference between "self-infliction"
or suicide and self-determination in cases like Gray.91
The court also dismissed the state's argument that starvation and
dehydration are painfil. The court relied on medical testimony indicat-
ing that Marcia could not feel the pain, 92 despite the parties' stipulation
that she reacted to some pain.93
The court addressed a third governmental interest, protecting inno-
cent third parties. The court again cited Tune, this time proposing that
its analysis is generally limited to protecting a patient's dependents.94
The court did not consider this state interest compelling, since the Gray
family would not be adversely affected.
The final state interest considered was preserving the integrity of
medical ethics. The court concluded that this too was not a compelling
interest, because the patient, not the medical professional, should make
the health care choice and can even refuse medical treatment.95
e. Should the court require Rhode Island Medical Center to cany out Marcia
Gray's wishes or may the Medical Center and its personnel refuse to
participate?
The Gray court recognized that terminating nutrition and hydration
obviously burdens those medical professionals who see providing food
and water as primary responsibilities. 96 While it applauded this concern,
the court said that these "professionals must acknowledge Marcia Gray's
right of self-determination. Accordingly, if Marcia Gray cannot be
promptly transferred to a health care facility that will respect her wishes,
the Rhode Island Medical Center must accede to her requests. 97
In making this determination, the court first noted that "the Consti-
tution rarely commands an affirmative obligation on the government's
part; instead, individual rights are stated in the negative, instructing the
government on what it cannot do."9 8 It further stated that autonomy
amounts to the right to make decisions without unwarranted governmen-
tal interference. Further, relying on Harris v. McRae,99 the court stated,
"the government is under no constitutional obligation ' to provide re-
90 Id.
91 IE See also Note, supra note 49, at 120. Without the distinction and immunity for health care
professionals, they could be liable for murder, manslaughter, assisting a suicide, wrongful death and
other illegal acts. Id
92 697 F. Supp. at 589.
93 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
94 697 F. Supp. at 589.
95 l The court cited Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1064 (1972) for the principle that the patient and not the health care professional determines what
care will be eventually used. For Rhode Island law specifically, the court cited R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-
17-19.1(4) (1985) ("patient shall have the right to refuse any treatment by the health care facility to
the extent permitted by law"). The court also cited Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 624-25, 295
A.2d 676, 687-88 (1972). But see infra note 134.
96 697 F. Supp. at 591.
97 Id. (emphasis added).
98 Id. at 590.
99 448 U.S. 297 (1980). In this case, the Supreme Court held that freedom from governmental
interference in an abortion decision before viability does not entitle a person to governmental funds
to procure an abortion. Id at 317-18.
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sources to enable an individual to take full advantage of his or her
rights." 100
With this in mind, the court reviewed Rhode Island legislation and
case law guaranteeing a patient's right to refuse medical treatment. 10'
The court found that the law guarantees a patient an implicit right "not
[to] be penalized for exercising his or her judgment."' 10 2 The court then
noted that once medical personnel discontinue giving food and water to
a patient, they can still provide other care such as "supportive care-pain
control, skin care, and personal hygiene."' 03 Seemingly, the court was
arguing that by providing such needed services, the medical staff main-
tains its integrity. Medical professionals would not merely abandon the
patient once they removed the feeding tube.
The court also considered the defendants' argument that legislation
allowing persons to refuse participation in abortion or sterilization pro-
cedures should apply to the instant case.' 0 4 The court dismissed this ar-
gument, finding that the state legislation clearly applies only to abortion
and sterilization cases. The court said that the federal legislation only
applies to particular federal health programs. The court inferred, how-
ever, that it may be used for procedures other than abortions and
sterilizations. 0 5
The court finally emphasized that Marcia's family had no idea that by
choosing the Medical Center it would be giving up her right to determine
what care she would receive. The Medical Center never articulated its
policy not to terminate feeding and hydrating through G-tubes until
Glenn Gray requested that medical personnel remove the G-tube. The
court concluded that "Marcia Gray and her family 'were entitled to rely
100 697 F. Supp. at 590 (emphasis in original).
101 Id. The relevant Rhode Island legislation is R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-17-19.1(4) (1985) which
applies to all health care facilities licensed under Chapter 17 of Title 23. 697 F. Supp. at 590 & n.5.
See R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-17-2(1) (1987). The parties stipulated Rhode Island Medical Center was
fully-licensed. Joint Stipulation of Facts, supra note 22, at 1.
For case law, the court referred to Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 625, 295 A.2d 676, 688
(1972), cited with approval in Beauvais v. Notre Dame Hosp., 120 R.I. 271, 275, 387 A.2d 689, 691
(1978).
102 697 F. Supp. at 590.
103 Id. (quoting Steinbrook & Lo, Artificial Feeding-Solid Ground, Not a Slippery Slope, 318 NEw ENG.
J. MED. 286, 288 (1988)).
104 Id. The Rhode Island legislation, R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-17-11 (1985), allows someone associ-
ated with a health care facility to refuse participation in abortion or sterilization procedures because
of religious or moral reasons. The court dismissed this argument here because the Rhode Island
language limits its application to abortion or sterilization procedures.
The defendants also argued that federal law, 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(d) (1982), should apply. That
law states:
No individual shall be required to perform or assist in the performance of any part of a
health service program... funded in whole or in part under a program administered by the
Secretary of Health and Human Services if his performance or assistance in the perform-
ance of such part of such program would be contrary to his religious beliefs or moral
convictions.
697 F. Supp. at 590 n.6 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(d) (1982)). In a footnote, the court stated that the
federal law did not apply because it relates only to specific federally funded health service programs
or research activities. Marcia Gray was not receiving such services. 697 F. Supp. at 590 n.6. It
seems as though the court might have applied the provision if she had been receiving these specific
federal services.
105 Id. See infra note 183 & 184 and accompanying text. See also infra note 180.
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on the... [hospital's] willingness to defer to their choice among courses
of medical treatment.' "106
Based on this analysis, on October 17, 1988, the court ordered
Rhode Island Medical Center either to transfer Marcia to a facility willing
to remove the G-tube, cutting off food and water, or to do so through its
own medical staff who remained opposed to doing so. The Medical
Center sent out letters to 140 institutions seeking one that would take
Marcia. 10 7 On November 16, 1988, Marcia was transferred to South
County Hospital, Wakefield, Rhode Island. En route by ambulance, Dr.
Robert Conrad removed the tube. Marcia Gray died fifteen days later. 108
II. Death By Starvation and Dehydration
This Note does not discuss whether termination of nutrition and hy-
dration for a persistently vegetative patient is appropriate. 09 Nonethe-
less, learning how a person starves or dehydrates once a G-tube is
removed illustrates the dilemma medical personnel confront when a fam-
ily member requests that a G-tube be removed and the patient be al-
lowed to die from starvation and dehydration.
Testimony in Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospital,"10 depicted this
dying process. In Brophy, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
addressed the sole issue of "whether the substituted judgment of an in-
competent patient-ward in a persistent vegetative state to refuse the con-
tinuance of artificial means of nutrition and hydration should be
honored.""' Like Marcia Gray, Paul Brophy suffered an aneurysm,"12
was in a persistent vegetative state,' 13 and medical personnel adamantly
refused to withdraw a G-tube."14 He, too, was not terminally ill but
would likely die from starvation and dehydration if medical staff removed
the G-tube. 115
The Massachusetts probate court initially decided the evidence
clearly indicated that, if competent, Brophy would want the G-tube re-
moved. Nonetheless, the probate court enjoined the attending hospital
and Mrs. Brophy, the guardian, from removing or clamping the tube." 6
106 697 F. Supp. at 591 (citingln re Requena, 213 NJ. Super. 443, 517 A.2d 869 (App. Div. 1986),
aff'g 213 NJ. Super. 475, 517 A.2d 886 (Ch. Div. 1986)).
107 N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1988, at 16, col. 3. A week after the court order, Rhode Island Governor
Edward DiPrete told Thomas Romeo, defendant and head of the State's Department of Mental
Health, Retardation and Hospitals, not to appeal. Romeo and the hospital administrator stated that
medical staff continued to object adamantly to removing the G-tube. Romeo reported that he felt
that it was a moral dilemma for him since he believes removing a feeding tube is the "moral
equivalent of murder" and he may be forcing employees to unwillingly become accomplices by obey-
ing the order if she cannot be transferred quickly. Although the Medical Center is state-run, Romeo
says that removing the tubes is inconsistent with his department's mission and policies. American
Medical News, Nov. 18, 1988, at 9.
108 Nat'l. Right to Life News, Dec. 15, 1988, at 5, col. 1.
109 See supra notes I & 2 for possible sources for that discussion.
110 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986).
111 Id. at 633.
112 Id at 628-29.
113 Id at 628.
114 Id at 632.
115 Id at 635.
116 Id at 628-29 & n.5.
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The Supreme Court of Massachusetts, after conducting a substituted
judgment analysis, 1 7 sustained the portion of the judgment respecting
the hospital and medical professionals' right to refuse to withdraw the
tube. The court, however, allowed Mrs. Brophy to transfer her husband
and authorize another facility to remove the G-tube."18
In analyzing the state's interest in maintaining the medical profes-
sion's integrity, the court concluded that it could not require the hospital
to withdraw or clamp the tube. The court stated that "so long as we
decline to force the hospital to participate in removing or clamping
Brophy's G-tube, there is no violation of the integrity of the medical pro-
fession."' "19 The court agreed with the probate court's finding that "the
hospital and its medical staff 'should not be compelled to withhold food
and water to a patient, contrary to its moral and ethical principles, when
such principles are recognized and accepted within a significant segment
of the medical profession and the hospital community.' "120 The court
found that neither the Massachusetts law, "the doctrine of informed con-
sent, nor any other provision of law requires the hospital to cease hydra-
tion and nutrition upon request of the guardian."'' The court found it
"particularly inappropriate to force the hospital, which [was] willing to
assist in a transfer of the patient, to take affirmative steps to end the pro-
vision of nutrition and hydration to him. A patient's right to refuse medi-
cal treatment does not warrant such an unnecessary intrusion upon the
hospital's ethical integrity in this case."' 122
When Mrs. Brophy originally made her request, Brophy's attending
physician, Dr. Lajos Koncz, refused to comply because he believed that
"he would wilfully be causing Brophy's death."' 23 The medical and
nursing staff essentially agreed. Dr. Richard Field, the hospital's physi-
cian-in-chief, stated that he could not comply, "personally or officially,"
because "it would constitute a harmful act which would deliberately pro-
duce death."' 24 The medical executive committee and the hospital's
board of directors concurred. The latter, however, would not oppose
transferring the patient if the court ordered that someone remove the
tube. 125
Dr. Koncz, the attending physician, testified that Brophy might expe-
rience some pain and suffering if the tube were removed. Justice Lynch,
in dissent, believed that the G-tube should not be removed, and ex-
plained in a footnote the process of death by starvation and dehydration.
The footnote provides a greater sense of what is at issue:
117 See supra note 10.
118 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626, 629 (1986).
119 Id. at 638.
120 Id. at 639.
121 Id. Earlier in its opinion, the court acknowledged a right of self-determination and individual
autonomy. It is from these common law rights that the court recognized the right to refuse medical
treatment, not from any constitutional right. Id. at 633-34. See infra note 133.
122 497 N.E.2d at 639 (1986).




Removal of the G tube would likely create various effects from the lack
of hydration and nutrition, leading ultimately to death. Brophy's
mouth would dry out and become caked or coated with thick material.
His lips would become parched and cracked. His tongue would swell,
and might crack. His eyes would recede back into their orbits and his
cheeks would become hollow. The lining of his nose might crack and
cause his nose to bleed. His skin would hang loose on his body and
become dry and scaly. His urine would become highly concentrated,
leading to burning of the bladder. The lining of his stomach would
dry out and he would experience dry heaves and vomiting. His body
temperature would become very high. His brain cells would dry out,
causing convulsions. His respiratory tract would dry out, and the thick
secretions that would result could plug his lungs and cause death. At
some point within five days to three weeks his major organs, including
his lungs, heart, and brain, would give out and he would die. The
judge found that death by dehydration is extremely painful and un-
comfortable for a human being. The judge could not rule out the pos-
sibility that Paul Brophy could experience pain in such a scenario.
Paul Brophy's attending physician described death by dehydration as
cruel and violent.' 26
The Gray court was concerned whether Marcia would feel hunger,
thirst, or pain if medical staff removed her feeding tube.' 27 While the
Gray opinion stated that her neurosurgeon did not believe she would ex-
perience these sensations, that opinion should not have been considered
definitive. The parties even stipulated prior to trial that "some reaction
to pain has been noted."'128
In response to reporters, the Medical Center's general counsel ar-
ticulated misconceptions people had regarding Marcia's condition and
the possible pain and suffering associated with dying by starvation and
dehydration. Referring to court records, he said they would "show that if
you walked into the room, Marcia Gray would turn her eyes toward
you .... If you gave pain, she'd withdraw her feet. If you made loud
noises, she had a startle reflex. She had sleep cycles. You could tell
when she was asleep, you could tell when she was awake."' 129 Though
rare, there have been instances when physicians were mistaken regarding
a person's "persistent vegetative state."' 3 0
126 Id. at 641 n.2 (Lynch, dissenting).
127 Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 583 (D.R.I. 1988).
128 Joint Stipulation of Facts, supra note 22, at 3. See also supra note 26.
129 Nat'l. Right to Life News, Dec. 15, 1988, at 5, col. 1.
130 Nat'l. Right to Life News, Feb. 1, 1989, at 4, col. I (quoting Schwaneberg, Newark Star-
Ledger, Nov. 27, 1988). A family member proposed removing a feeding tube from a relative in a
persistent vegetative state. Complying with New Jersey Supreme Court holdings, two neurologists
were called to confirm the physician's diagnosis that the patient was in a persistent vegetative state.
The first confirmed the diagnosis; the second neurologist said hello to the patient and the patient
responded hello. See also N.Y. Times, April 13, 1989, at B3, col. 5. New York's highest court author-
ized removing incompetent patients' feeding tubes when a patient's wishes can be determined from
"clear proof". In early April, 1989, the first right-to-die petition allowing-this was granted, but the
judge had to vacate it when the patient began recovering. The 86 year old patient, Carrie Coons,
was in a persistent vegetative state for over four months. The court granted a right-to-die petition
but ordered the family to wait two weeks and transfer her to another hospital. The newspaper ac-
count did not report the court's reasons for this stipulation.
During the two weeks, Mrs. Coons became alert enough to speak briefly about the "legal quan-
dary" surrounding her care. New York case law only allows a court to grant right-to-die petitions
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Proponents of removing the tube said Marcia would die within five
days. In fact, she died over two weeks later. Before her death, she re-
portedly lost fifty pounds and was given Valium to reduce seizures.131
III Conscience Clauses Are Needed To Protect Medical Personnel
A. The Supreme Court Is Not Likely to Resolve the Issue
It is unlikely that the Supreme Court's decision in Cruzan v. Har-
mon 3 2 will resolve the conflict illustrated by Gray and Brophy as to
whether a court may order a medical facility, and its staff, to remove a
feeding tube, when doing so contravenes the institution's ethos or the
staff's ethical convictions.13 3 The conflict involves preserving medical in-
tegrity and protecting the rights of individuals and institutions that re-
fuse to withhold food and water from their patients. 34 The Gray court
when there is "clear proof that an incompetent patient would have wished that to be done." When
asked what she would have wished, Mrs. Coons said she was not sure. She said, "These are difficult
decisions," and that she would "like to wait" on any decision regarding the feeding tube. Id.
Dr. Ronald E. Cranford, a Minneapolis neurologist, past president of the American Society of
Law and Medicine, and a White House commission consultant on right to die issues, stated that this
dramatic case "shows you that you're basically never dealing with certainties here." Id. It seems
there are two uncertainties in this case. First, the diagnosis and prognosis are uncertain. Second,
the validity of the surrogate decision is uncertain.
Another uncertainty to be considered is the potential for medical advancements that might
bring a patient out of a persistent vegetative state. See South Bend Tribune, March 28, 1990, at 1,
col. I. On March 12, 1990, a Wisconsin man who had been in a persistent vegetative state for eight
years awoke after receiving a painkiller, Valium, while having dental work done. He "fell asleep
about five minutes .... Then he woke up and started talking. He was able to answer questions, say
his name, to feed himself and walk." Id. at col. 3.
After lapsing back into the vegetative state, a second dose awoke him again for 90 minutes. His
neurologist at the University of Wisconsin Hospital, Dr. Andres Kanner, witnessed the second inci-
dent. Kanner commented, "I have to tell you he was a different man. He knew his name, the name
of his family, where he used to work. He could add, subtract and perform complicated calculations."
Id. While doctors do not know why the drugs help him, they theorize that the benzodiazepines, the
family of drugs including Valium, which "inhibit certain functions of the nervous system, are block-
ing the effects of the vegetative state." Id. at col. 4. The drugs have given him lucid intervals of 10
to 12 hours. Prior to this, doctors knew little about how to treat him and had little hope for any
recovery. Id.
131 Nat'l. Right to Life News, Dec. 15, 1988, at 5, col. 1.
132 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989).
133 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), its progeny, and Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs.,
109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989), found a right to an abortion during various stages of pregnancy overriding
any state interests until viability. Those Supreme Court decisions did not adequately address medi-
cal personnel's role in performing those "constitutionally-protected" abortions. Congress ad-
dressed the issue in the Church Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (1974). Congress enacted a
conscience clause clearly setting out a right in some instances to refuse participation in performing
abortions and sterilizations. This statute only pertains to procedures performed in a federally
funded health service program or research activity. In the future, one of its provisions may be ap-
plied to cases like Gray. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
Cruzan asks the Supreme Court whether the privacy right extends to include a constitutionally
protected right to die. In the alternative, the Court may conclude that there is a right to make these
care decisions based on the common law that has been used for years for the general proposition
that patients can refuse medical treatment. See supra note 121. Cruzan is also asking who should make
the surrogate decisions for incompetent patients. The Court is not likely to address whether courts
or others may compel medical personnel to participate, since that issue is not directly present in
Cruzan. It is likely the next issue to be resolved, however, if the Court finds some right, whether
constitutionally-based or not, to refuse nutrition and hydration. It is conceivable that the Court will
leave this issue to the legislature as it did in the abortion context.
134 Courts have balanced a patient's right to refuse medical treatment against four state interests.
Included in these is the integrity of the medical profession. It was in evaluating this interest that the
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cited Brophy numerous times throughout its analysis but neglected to do
so when considering two questions: whether the state's interest in main-
taining the medical profession's integrity would override a person's right
to refuse treatment, and whether a court could force an institution and its
staff to remove a patient's G-tube, and consequently his food and
water. 135
The Brophy court clearly opposed forcing institutions and medical
staff to remove feeding tubes; it feared this might violate the medical
profession's integrity.13 6 In contrast, the Gray court recognized that re-
moving the feeding tube would be "unsettling" and "a great burden on
health care professionals," but declared that they "must acknowledge
Marcia Gray's right of self-determination."'' 37 The Gray court then or-
dered the hospital to transfer Marcia to a facility that would "respect her
wishes" or the hospital would have to "accede to her requests" itself.138
The court knew that the staff unanimously and adamantly opposed re-
moving the tube.'39 What if the Medical Center had not been able to
transfer Marcia and the professionals on her case continued to oppose
removing the tube on religious or ethical grounds? The court's mandate
did not provide for any exception for religiously-based objections.
Brophy court concluded that "so long as we decline to force the hospital to participate in removing or
clamping Brophy's G-tube, there is no violation of the integrity of the medical profession." Brophy
v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E. 2d 626, 638 (1986). Other courts have not
been finding a compelling state interest which would supersede the rights of the individual patient
on the grounds that the medical profession's integrity would be unduly harmed. See e.g. In reJobes,
108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434,450 stay deniedsub nom. Lincoln Park Nursing and Convalescent Home v.
Kahn, 483 U.S. 1036 (1987).
135 697 F. Supp. at 589-906. Instead the court referred to Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295
A.2d 676 (1972) and In reJobes, 108 NJ. 394, 529 A.2d 434 stay deniedsub non. Lincoln Park Nursing
and Convalescent Home v. Kahn, 483 U.S. 1036 (1987). InJobes, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
reversed the trial court's holding that the nursing home was entitled to refuse to withdraw Mrs.
Jobes' jejunostomy tube (hereinafter j-tube), providing her food and water, and transfer her to an-
other facility. 529 A.2d at 437. The court reversed the lower court because the facility had never
informed the Jobes family of its policies, giving the family "no reason to believe that they were
surrendering the right to choose among medical alternatives when they placed her in the nursing
home." Id. at 450. The court emphasized, however, that it did "not decide the case in which a
nursing home gave notice of its policy not to participate in the withdrawal or withholding of artificial
feeding at the time of a patient's admission. Thus, [it did] not hold that such a policy is never
enforceable." ll
See also Seidel, The Hospital and Abortion, CASE AND COMMENT 24 July-Aug. 1974, at 24 for the
proposition that Roe failed to address the issue of protecting health care professionals who refuse to
participate in abortions for ethical reasons; Greco v. Orange Memorial Hosp., 513 F.2d 873 (5th Cir.
1975) cert. denied 423 U.S. 1000 (1975), coupled with Webster v. Reproductive Health Svs., 109 S. Ct.
3040 (1989), for the proposition that the Supreme Court found it unnecessary to clarify it in its
abortion opinions.
136 497 N.E.2d at 638. See supra note 134.
137 Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp 580, 591 (D.R.I. 1988).
138 Id.
139 Id at 583.
The Guardian Ad Litem has reported to the (c)ourt that the hospital as an institution is
opposed to denying Mrs. Gray nutrition and hydration because it is tantamount to euthana-
sia, inconsistent with the physician's role as safekeeper of his or her patient's well being, the
fear that the hospital has of civil or criminal responsibility and the reputation which the
hospital has (as) an institution for long-term care and the treatment of chronic care pa-
tients. Those professional health care personnel who administer to Mrs. Gray's needs pres-
ently are unanimous in their adamant opposition to the proposal to remove nutrition and
hydration.
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The Gray court relied on In re Jobes 140 when it ordered the Medical
Center to either transfer Marcia Gray or remove the tube. BothJobes and
Gray involved a facility which did not clearly announce its policy against
withholding or withdrawing nutrition and hydration. It seems less likely
that a court would force an institution to participate if the institution had
clearly expressed its policies. This notice would conceivably prohibit a
patient from reasonably relying on the hospital's deference to patients in
this particular decision.141
Private medical care facilities could begin publicizing these policies
to incoming patients as a way to possibly shield themselves from judicial
orders inconsistent with their moral or ethical policies. However, there
must be some more substantially certain protection for medical person-
nel who could not in good conscience participate in withdrawing nutri-
tion and hydration. More than the patient's individual rights are at stake
in these cases. The individual rights of medical personnel are also at
issue.
B. Whose Civil Rights are Affected in these Cases?
Mr. Gray based his claim on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Civil Rights Act of
1871.142 The statute clearly sets out that a plaintiff must assert two pri-
mary allegations for a section 1983 claim. The plaintiff must allege first
that a person was acting under color of state law. Secondly, while acting
under state law, that person deprived the plaintiff of a federal right. 143
Gray and similar plaintiffs claim that an individual has a federal right
"to control fundamental medical decisions that affect his or her own
body.., properly grounded in the liberties protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process clause."' 144 The Gray court noted that while
the Supreme Court has never directly addressed whether a person has a
federal constitutional right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment,
the Court's decisions have repeatedly affirmed the common law principle
of individual self-determination. 145
Mr. Gray first argued that the hospital was acting under state law, as
a state actor, because it was a state facility. He then alleged that the hos-
pital would deprive his incompetent wife of her federal right if it did not
140 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 stay denied sub nom. Lincoln Park Nursing and Convalescent Home
v. Kahn, 483 U.S. 1036 (1987).
141 See supra note 135 and accompanying text. See also Miles, Singer & Siegler, supra note I for a
discussion of mission statements and institutional missions.
142 See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
143 J. Mahoney, The Prima Facie Section 1983 Case, in SWORD AND SHIELD 119, 120 (R. Freilich and
R. Carlisle ed. (1983)(citing Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980)).
By the plain terms of § 1983, two -and only two- allegations are required in order to
state a cause of action under that statute. First, the plaintiff must allege that some person
has deprived him of a federal right. Second, he must allege that the person who has de-
prived him of that right has acted under color of state or territorial law.
Id. Mahoney suggests addressing other elements for a prima facie case, but these two are fundamen-
tal and clearly required by statute.
144 697 F. Supp. at 585.
145 Id. Thus, the Supreme Court, in Cruzan, may determine that there is a right to refuse a feed-
ing tube and that a surrogate may exercise an incompetent patient's right for him. The Court could
find this right based in the common law or based in the Constitution. If it finds the latter basis, the
Court will most likely be extending the privacy right used to justify abortion.
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follow his request, made under substituted judgment, 146 and withdraw
her feeding tube.
When a court orders a hospital to remove a feeding tube, as it did in
.Gray, it is also acting as a state actor. 147 Leaving aside the hospital's
'rights for a moment, the court may be depriving individual medical pro-
fessionals or staff of their individual federal rights. As individuals, medi-
cal personnel have first amendment rights. One obvious first
amendment right is the freedom to exercise one's own religion. 148 A
court ordering a hospital to "promptly" transfer the patient or "accede
to her requests" is at least indirectly forcing individuals to take actions
that may be contrary to their religious convictions. 149 In Gray, these ac-
tions were contrary to the convictions of doctors, staff and administra-
tors, aside from even considering the institution's ethos. 150
146 See supra note 10.
147 In Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), the Supreme Court held that a state was responsible
for discrimination, when its court enforced racially discriminatory restrictive covenants. This court
action amounted to state action in the discrimination and violated the fourteenth amendment's equal
protection clause.
148 See supra note 50 for text of the first and fourteenth amendments.
149 See Miles, Singer & Siegler, supra note 1, at 48. Relying on George Annas, a noted medical
ethicist, the physicians who authored this article conclude that "health care facilities have no institu-
tional responsibility for the morality of medical decisions made inside their walls. Yet in many ways
society articulates expectations of the moral obligation of such facilities." Id. Examples include
establishing ethics committees and requiring facilities to adopt policies governing decisions regard-
ing withholding resuscitation. Referring to Annas again, the three physicians state that:
[C]ourts should hesitate to force health care facilities to carry out morally controversial
treatment requests. Some nurses and physicians have profound moral objections to partici-
pating in certain treatment plans, such as those that require caring for a patient who has
refused feeding. The right of individual providers of health care to refuse to participate in
treatment plans that they find morally objectionable has been well established. As the Pres-
ident's Commission [for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and
Behavioral Research, Making Health Care Decisions: A Report on the Ethical and Legal
Implications of Informed Consent in the Patient-Practitioner Relationship] noted, a health
professional is not "obligated to accede to the patient in a way that violates ... the pro-
vider's own deeply held moral beliefs." If the courts cannot compel people to violate their
own conscientiously held moral standards, then it follows that on occasion institutions may
be unable to comply with court-ordered directives to carry out certain actions, because no
one in the institution is willing to do so.
lId at 48-49 (footnotes omitted)
150 697 F. Supp. at 583. The Gray court did not state whether the staff's convictions were relig-
iously-based. The court failed to address the freedom of religion issue altogether. The Supreme
Court has provided guidance as to what convictions the first amendment protects. In Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the Court stated that "to have the protection of the Religion Clauses,
the claims must be rooted in religious belief." Id. at 215. They cannot be "merely a matter of per-
sonal preference." Id at 216 (emphasis added). In United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965), the
Supreme Court interpreted federal statutory law as exempting conscientious objectors from combat-
ant service when their opposition was based on "religious training and belief" as opposed to a
"merely personal moral code." Id. at 173. A merely personal moral code is a "moral code which is
not only personal but which is the sole basis for the [individual's] belief and is in no way related to a
Supreme Being." Id. at 186. "The validity of what he believes cannot be questioned .... [The] task
is to decide whether the beliefs professed by an [individual] are sincerely held and whether they are,
in his own scheme of things, religious." Id. at 184-85 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has also
held that it is not necessary for all members of a sect to hold the same conviction. Thomas v. Review
Bd. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
Of course, once a religious belief is found and a state action is interfering with one's exercise of
that belief, the next inquiry is whether there is a compelling state interest overriding the first amend-
ment right. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). Since the issue presented in this Note is
analogous to protecting health care providers' consciences in the abortion context, such a compel-
ling state interest is unlikely. Congress, in fact, enacted a conscience clause to protect medical per-
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A Catholic priest of the Providence Diocese, Rev. Robert J. Mc-
Manus, wrote a theological opinion on the Grays' behalf. With respect to
the court order, he told media that his "only concern would be that it is
never right to ask people to violate their consciences .... Ideally there
should not be a conflict [between a government's law and moral law], but
sometimes, in point of fact there is. And one is obligated to follow the
moral law."' l5 1
The President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research (the "Commission")
noted in its report that medical staff is not "obligated to accede to the
patient in a way that violates ... the provider's own deeply held moral
beliefs. ' 52 The Commission concluded that: "As in medical decisionmak-
ing generally, some constraints on patients' decisions are justified.
Health care professionals or institutions may decline to provide a partic-
ular option because that choice would violate their conscience or profes-
sionaljudgment, though in doing so they may not abandon a patient." 153
The Gray court is the first federal court to order a hospital to transfer
its patient or remove the feeding tube over the moral objections of the
institution and individual health care providers. Therefore, it is under-
standable that medical personnel have not previously brought section
1983 actions to challenge such an order. If other courts follow the Gray
result, medical personnel choosing to resist such court orders may face
the penalty of contempt of court. In the abortion context, statutes have
protected medical personnel from this dilemma to some degree. They
appropriately allow objections on religious or moral foundation. 154
C. An Analogy to the Abortion Conscience Clause
In Doe v. Bolton, 155 Roe v. W ad's t 56 companion case, the Supreme
Court invalidated numerous provisions of a Georgia statute. The Court
held that these provisions unconstitutionally interfered with a right to an
abortion. However, the Court did not find Georgia's conscience clause
protecting medical personnel objectionable. The court stated that,
under Georgia law, the hospital was "free not to admit a patient for an
abortion .... [A] physician or any other employee has the right to re-
sonnel opposed to performing abortions and sterilizations. Senate debate on that matter, focussed
on the first amendment right to exercise religious beliefs. See infra notes 159-192 and accompanying
text. Moreover, a compelling state interest is served by protecting the consciences of medical per-
sonnel; medical integrity is maintained by such actions. See supra note 134.
151 Gianelli, R.I. Governor Bars Appeal on Life-Support Decision, Am. Medical News, Nov. 18, 1988, at
11, col. 2. See also supra note 53 discussing St. Thomas Aquinas and unjust laws. Aquinas states that
all law derives from eternal law. Unjust laws are therefore not laws at all and do not bind one's
conscience. According to Aquinas, one should never obey those unjust laws that are inconsistent
with the eternal law. Id.
152 Miles, Singer & Siegler, supra note 1, at 49 (citing PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF
ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE
DECISIONS: A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT IN THE PA-
TIENT-PRACTITIONER RELATIONSHIP, 48, (U.S.G.P.O., March, 1983).
153 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 3.
154 See infra notes 159-189 and accompanying text.
155 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
156 Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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frain, for moral or religious reasons, from participating in the abortion
procedure."157 The Court continued: "These provisions obviously are in
the statute in order to afford appropriate protection to the individual and
to the denominational hospital." 158
Not all states have conscience clauses for such "appropriate protec-
tion." There is now a federal conscience clause protecting medical per-
sonnel in federally assisted facilities with respect to abortion and
sterilization procedures. On June 18, 1973, six months after Roe and Bol-
ton, President Nixon signed into law the Health Programs Extension
Act.' 5 9 Provisions of that act, known as the Church Amendment,1 60
"prohibit a court or a public official... from requiring an individual or
institution to perform or assist in the performance of sterilization proce-
dures or abortions, if such action would be contrary to religious or moral
convictions." 161
157 Bolton, 410 U.S. at 197-98. The Georgia conscience clause stated, in part:
Nothing in this section shall require a hospital to admit any patient under the provisions
hereof for the purpose of performing an abortion .... A physician, or any other person
who is a member of or associated with the staff of a hospital, or any employee of a hospital
in which an abortion has been authorized, who shall state in writing an objection to such
abortion on moral or religious grounds shall not be required to participate in the medical
procedures which will result in the abortion, and the refusal of any such person to partici-
pate therein shall not form the basis of any claim for damages on account of such refusal or
for any disciplinary or recriminatory action against such person.
Id. at 205 (citing GA. GRIM. CODE § 26-1202(e)(1968).
158 IL at 198 (emphasis added).
159 The Health Programs Extension Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-45, 87 Stat. 91 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (1982)).
160 Senator Church of Idaho proposed the provisions in an amendment.
161 Pub. L. No. 93-45, 87 Stat. 91 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (1982)). Senator
Church's original amendment read as follows:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Federal Government, in the administration of all
Federal programs, that religious beliefs which proscribe the performance of abortions or
sterilization procedures (or limit the circumstances under which abortions or sterilizations
may be performed) shall be respected.
Any provision of law, regulation, contract, or other agreement to the contrary notwith-
standing, on and after the enactment of the Act, there shall not be imposed, applied, or
enforced, in or in connection with the administration of diy program established orfinanced
totally or in part by the Federal Government which provides or assists in paying for health care
services for individuals or assists hospitals or other health care institutions, any require-
ment, condition, or limitation, which would result in causing or attempting to cause, or
obligate, any physician, other health care personnel, or any hospital or other health care
institution, to perform, assist in the performance of, or make facilities or personnel avail-
able for or to assist in the performance of, any abortion or sterilization procedure on any
individual, if the performance of such abortion or sterilization procedure on such individual
would be contrary to the religious beliefs of such physician or other health care personnel,
or of the person or group sponsoring or administering such hospital or other institution.
119 CONG. REC. 9595 (1973) (emphasis added).
On the Senate floor, Illinois Senator Stevenson recommended that the clause extend protection
to those objecting for moral reasons. Senator Church agreed to modify the language accordingly.
Id. at 9595-96 (statements of Sen. Stevenson and Sen. Church).
The provisions were also amended to include New York Senatorjavits' anti-discrimination pro-
vision. He voiced concern that constitutional questions may arise ifa denominational hospital could
fire its staff for performing abortions in other facilities even though they refrained while in the de-
nominational hospital. Javits raised other constitutional questions. Id. at 9598-99 (statement by Sen.
Javits). Because of those, the Conference Committee adopted different language.
The provisions have been amended over the years, namely § 300a-7(d) and (e) were added.
Today the statute reads:
§ 300a-7. Sterilization or abortion
(a) Omitted
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
In November, 1972, a court enjoined a private, Catholic hospital to
allow a woman's doctor to perform a sterilization operation during a
Caesarian section delivery. That preliminary injunction prompted this
(b) Prohibition of public officials and public authorities from imposition of certain re-
quirements contrary to religious beliefs or moral convictions
The receipt of any grant, contract, loan, or loan guarantee under the Public Health Service
Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 201 et seq.], the Community Mental Health Centers Act [42 U.S.C.A.
§ 2689 et seq.], or the Developmental Disabilities Services and Facilities Construction Act
[42 U.S.C.A. § 6000 et seq.] by any individual or entity does not authorize any court or any
public official or other public authority to require-
(1) such individual to perform or assist in the performance of any sterilization proce-
dure or abortion if his performance or assistance in the performance of such procedure
or abortion would be contrary to his religious beliefs or moral convictions; or
(2) such entity to-
(A) make its facilities available for the performance of any sterilization procedure
or abortion if the performance of such procedure or abortion in such facilities is
prohibited by the entity on the basis of religious beliefs or moral convictions, or
(B) provide any personnel for the performance or assistance in the performance
of any sterilization procedure or abortion if the performance or assistance in the
performance of such procedures or abortion by such personnel would be contrary
to the religious beliefs or moral convictions of such personnel.
(c) Discrimination prohibition
(1) No entity which receives a grant, contract, loan or loan guarantee under the
[aforementioned acts] after June 18, 1973 may-
(A) discriminate in the employment, promotion, or termination of employment
of any physician or other health care personnel, or
(B) discriminate in the extension of staff or other privileges to any physician or
other health care personnel,
because he performed or assisted in the performance of a lawful sterilization procedure
or abortion, because he refused to perform or assist in the performance of such a pro-
cedure or abortion on the grounds that his performance or assistance in the perform-
ance of the procedure or abortion would be contrary to his religious beliefs or moral
convictions, or because of his religious beliefs or moral convictions respecting steriliza-
tion procedures or abortions.
(2) No entity which receives afterJuly 12, 1974, a grant or contract for biomedical or
behavioral research under any program administered by the Secretary of Health and
Human Services may-
(A) discriminate in the employment, promotion, or termination of employment
of any physician or other health care personnel, or
(B) discriminate in the extension of staff or other privileges to any physician or
other health care personnel,
because he performed or assisted in the performance of any lawful health service or re-
search activity, because he refused to perform or assist in the performance of any such
service or activity on the grounds that his performance or assistance in the performance of
such service or activity would be contrary to his religious beliefs or moral convictions, or
because of his religious beliefs or moral convictions respecting any such service or activity.
(d) Individual rights respecting certain requirements contrary to religious beliefs or moral
convictions
No individual shall be required to perform or assist in the performance of any part of a
health service program or research activity funded in whole or in part under a program
administered by the Secretary of Health and Human Services if his performance or assist-
ance in the performance of such part of such program or activity would be contrary to his
religious beliefs or moral convictions.
(e) Prohibition on entities receiving Federal grants, etc., from discriminating against ap-
plicants for training or study because of refusal of applicant to participate on religious or
moral grounds
No entity which receives, after September 29, 1979, any grant, contract, loan, loan guaran-
tee, or interest subsidy under [the aforementioned acts] may deny admission or otherwise
discriminate against any applicant (including applicants for internships and residencies) for
training or study because of the applicant's reluctance, or willingness, to counsel, suggest,
recommend, assist, or in any way participate in the performance of abortions or steriliza-
tions contrary to or consistent with the applicant's religious beliefs or moral convictions.
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legislation.' 62 The district court, granting the preliminary injunction,
found that the Catholic hospital acted "under color of law" because it
received favorable tax treatment and it received federal Hill-Burton
funds 163 to defray some hospital remodeling and construction costs over
the years 1956 to 1963.164 As a state actor, it could not interfere with a
woman's right to an abortion. After Congress enacted the Church
Amendment, the court dissolved its injunction, finding that "by its plain
language, the Act prohibits any court from finding that a hospital which
receives Hill-Burton funds is acting under color of state law."' 65 The
Ninth Circuit affirmed this and further held that the fact that St. Vin-
cent's hospital had the only maternity ward in the area was insufficient to
42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (1982).
It appears as though Senator Church's original language, coupled with the modification includ-
ing moral objections and the subsequent amendments in 1974 and 1979, may have established a
more far-reaching conscience clause. By looking solely at the language, ofie could conclude that
Senator Church did not want to limit the protection only to medical treatment provided under the
three bills reauthorized by the Health Programs Extension Act.
This conscience clause did not apply in Gray. The defendants in Gray argued that they were
protected from a court order by 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (d). In a footnote, the court responded that
since Marcia Gray did not receive treatment under a health service program (one of the types of
programs reauthorized by the original Health Programs Extension Act), this provision did not apply.
697 F. Supp. at 590 n.6. See infra note 180.
162 Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 369 F. Supp. 948, 950 & n.1 (D. Mont. 1973) (citing 1973 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 1553 (sic) (The correct page number is 1473)). The court cited this
legislative history since Congress enacted the Church Amendment as a direct reaction to the prelimi-
nary injunction. After Congress enacted the Church Amendment the court dissolved the injunction.
Senator Church, in proposing the amendment on the Senate floor, stated:
Even though the Supreme Court's decision (Roe) does not impose the obligation upon a
hospital there is nothing in existing law to prevent zealous administrators from requiring
the performance of abortions, within the limits of the Court's decision, as a part of their
regulations pertaining to federally funded programs .... Already a case has arisen which
should furnish us with ample grounds for legislative action. A Federal district court in
Montana, in the case of Mike and Gloria Taylor against St. Vincent Hospital, has issued a
temporary injunction, compelling a Catholic hospital, contrary to Catholic beliefs, to allow
its facilities to be used for a sterilization operation. The district court based its jurisdiction
upon the fact that the hospital had received Hill-Burton funds.
Given the injunction .... together with the possible administrative ramifications of the re-
cent Supreme Court decision on abortions, it should be evident that a provision needs to be
written into the law to fortify freedom of religion as it relates to the implementation of any
and all Federal programs affecting medicine and medical care.
119 CONG. REc. 9595 (1973).
163 The Church Amendment covers Hill-Burton Act funds since the Hill-Burton Act is a sub-
chapter of the Public Health Services Act. Hill-Burton funds are granted:
(a) to assist the several States in the carrying out of their programs for the construction
and modernization of such public or other non-profit community hospitals and other medi-
cal facilities as may be necessary, in conjunction with existing facilities, to furnish adequate
hospital, clinic, or similar services to all their people;
(b) to stimulate the development of new or improved types of physical facilities for medi-
cal, diagnostic, preventive, treatment, or rehabilitative services; and
(c) to promote research, experiments, and demonstrations relating to the effective devel-
opment and utilization of hospital, clinic or similar services, facilities, and resources, and to
promote the coordination of such research, experiments, and demonstrations and the use-
ful application of their results.
42 U.S.C. § 291 (1982).
164 369 F. Supp. at 950 & n.1 (D. Mont. 1973) (citing 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws
1553 [sic] (The correct page number is 1473)).
165 Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 523 F.2d 75, 76 (9th Cir. 1975). This was the later Taylor case
brought on appeal. This court affirmed the district court when it dissolved its original injunction.
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constitute "state action" under the theory that it monopolized maternity
services.1 66 Therefore, a section 1983 claim could not be made.
Senator Church from Idaho intended to statutorily declare that "no
federal funding of hospitals, medical research, or medical care may be
conditioned upon the violation of religious precepts."' 167 During Senate
floor debate he stated: "Nothing is more fundamental to our national
birthright than freedom of religion. Religious belief must remain above
the reach of secular authority."' 168 The Senate expanded the original
amendment to protect health care providers objecting on moral, but not
necessarily religious, grounds.169
Throughout the Senate floor debate over the Church Amendment, it
became clear that senators were addressing two distinct concerns. Pro-
tecting the individual health personnel was the first and uncontroverted
concern. 170 Senator Javits of New York, in the midst of raising possible
constitutional objections and various amendments, stated, "[I]f this were
confined to the moral and religious convictions of the individual-that is,
the physician or the individual health personnel, I do not see how any-
body can object."' 171 However, protecting the institutional ethos pre-
sented more problems. These included whether Congress would violate
the Constitution's establishment clause by allowing an institution to have
religious scruples. 172
During the Senate floor debate, Senator Kennedy of Massachusetts
and chairman of the Health subcommittee stated that "Congress has the
authority under the Constitution to exempt individuals from any require-
ment that they perform medical procedures that are objectionable to
their religious convictions. Indeed, in many cases, the Constitution itself
is sufficient to grant an exemption to protect persons from official acts
that infringe on their free exercise of religion."' 173
Senator Kennedy noted that Congress exempted conscientious ob-
jectors from the Selective Service. 174 To qualify, conscientious objectors
must oppose war because of a truly held belief that is somewhat related
166 Id. at 77-78. See also DeShaney v. Winnebago County DSS, 109 S.Ct. 998, 1009 (1989) (Bren-
nan, dissenting); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982); Estelle v. Gamble 492 U.S. 97 (1976);
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) for the proposition that monopolizing particular serv-
ices may constitute "state action," invoking the fourteenth amendment.
167 119 CONG. REC. 9595 (1973) (statement of Sen. Church).
Senator Church stated that thousands of hospitals had been "built, remodeled, enlarged, mod-
ernized or equipped" with Hill-Burton funds. The federal funds were granted on the condition that
hospitals would comply with certain Federal regulations which the Government could stipulate after
hospitals had received the grants. Nothing in Roe, or its companion case, prohibits tying an obliga-
tion to perform abortions to these funds, even regarding denominational facilities. Id. This would
create major problems for a hospital founded on religious convictions that do not tolerate abortion.
168 Id.
169 Id See supra note 161.
170 119 CONG. REC. 9598 (1973) (statement of Sen. Javits).
171 Id
172 Id. SenatorJavits raised questions with other possible constitutional underpinnings including
whether giving money to institutions that prohibit legal medical procedures would violate the equal
protection clause.
173 Id. at 9602 (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
174 Id.
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to a Supreme Being. 175 He then specifically cited two Supreme Court
cases, Sherbert v. Vemer 176 and Wisconsin v. Yoder,177 in which the Court
protected individuals' religious exercise rights without violating the es-
tablishment clause.178
175 In United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965), the Supreme Court interpreted a federal
statute and exempted certain individuals from combatant service because they were conscientiously
opposed to all war (not only unjust wars) and their opposition was based in "religious training and
belief," not in "political, sociological or philosophical" views. The court clarified what one needs to
show to be a conscientious objector. First, the truth of the belief is insignificant in these cases; one
need only show that he truly holds the belief. The Court held that:
[W]hile the "truth" of a belief is not open to question, there remains the significant ques-
tion of whether it is "truly held." This is the threshold question of sincerity which must be
resolved in every case. It is, of course, a question of fact - a prime consideration to the
validity of every claim for exemption as a conscientious objector.
Id at 185.
Second, the objection must be based on "religious training and belief" and not on a "merely
personal moral code". The Court explained that the statutory definition of conscientious objector
excepts those whose beliefs are based on a merely personal moral code and that:
The use by Congress of the words "merely personal" seems to us to restrict the exception
[from the definition of conscientious objector] to a moral code which is not only personal
but which is the sole basis for the registrant's belief and is in no way related to a Supreme
Being. It follows, therefore, that if the claimed religious beliefs of the respective registrants
in these cases meet the test that we lay down then their objections cannot be based on a
"merely personal" moral code.
Id at 186.
That "test" the Court laid down is: "A sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life
of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the ex-
emption (from Selective Service) comes within the statutory definition." Idl at 176.
176 374 U.S. 398 (1963). The landmark case, Sherbert v. Verner, exempted Seventh Day Advent-
ists from a state requirement that they be willing to work Saturdays to receive unemployment bene-
fits. The Court used the strict scrutiny standard in this case and has since reaffirmed this standard in
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987).
177 406 U.S. 205 (1972). In Yoder, the Court unanimously held that Amish children were not
required to comply with Wisconsin's compulsory school law. Compelling the parents to send their
children to public high school would interfere with the exercise of their religion since their religion
requires one to live in a community separate from the modern world. Moreover, the state interest in
educating its youth was not compelling. The Amish proved to be productive without this further
schooling. Even if the Amish children ever left their community they had skills that would be mar-
ketable in the modern world.
178 119 CONG. REC. 9602 (1973) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). Since 1973, the Supreme Court
has clarified its opinions. In Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981), the Court relied on Sher-
bert v. Verner. It held that Indiana could not deny unemployment benefits to a Jehovah's Witness-
who quit his job when his employer transferred him to the department producing turrets for military
tanks. He successfully claimed that his religion forbade participation in producing armaments even
though otherJehovah's Witnesses did not feel their religion prohibited such employment. In revers-
ing the Indiana court, the Supreme Court stated:
The Indiana Court also appears to have given significant weight to the fact that another
Jehovah's Witness had no scruples about working on tank turrets; for that other Witness, at
least, such work was "scripturally" acceptable. Intrafaith differences of that kind are not
uncommon among followers of a particular creed, and the judicial process is singularly ill
equipped to resolve such differences in relation to the Religion Clauses. One can, of
course, imagine an asserted claim so bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in motivation, as not to
be entitled to protection under the Free Exercise Clause; but that is not the case here, and
the guarantee of free exercise is not limited to beliefs which are shared by all of the mem-
bers of a religious sect .... Courts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation. The narrow
function of a reviewing court in this context is to determine whether there was an appropri-
ate finding that petitioner terminated his work because of an honest conviction that such
work was forbidden by his religion.
Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 715-16 (1981).
More recently in Frazee v. Illinois Employment Sec., 109 S. Ct. 1514 (1989), the Supreme Court
reiterated this point:
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Senator Kennedy also addressed the more difficult issue, whether
Congress can protect a medical institution itself. In searching for prece-
dent, Senator Kennedy sought cases in which courts granted institutions
other first amendment protection. He noted that the "Pentagon papers
case," for example, extended the freedom of speech protection to indi-
vidual members of the press and to the Washington Post and New York
Times. Moreover, he commented that the Court would most likely honor
Congress' judgment if it found it "necessary and proper" to grant insti-
tutions this protection to more fully protect the first amendment rights of
individual medical personnel. 179
In the end, the Church Amendment protected both individuals and
institutions from being compelled to act against moral or religious con-
victions. This legislation is limited, however, because it is tied to particu-
lar federal funding or programs and not all medical facilities and
personnel. The Gray opinion highlighted this limitation. The Rhode Is-
land Medical Center and Romeo, the Director of the Department of
Mental Health, Retardation and Hospitals, argued that the court should
apply this provision to protect them in Gray. The court answered in a
footnote that the legislation did not apply because Marcia was not receiv-
ing treatment through a "health service program. ' 80
Our judgment in those cases (Sherbert and Thomas, as well as Hobbie v. Unemployment Ap-
peals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987)) rested on the fact that each of the claimants had a
sincere belief that religion required him or her to refrain from the work in question. Never
did we suggest that unless a claimant belongs to a sect that forbids what his job requires, his
belief, however sincere, must be deemed a purely personal preference rather than a reli-
gious belief.
Frazee v. Illinois Employment Sec., 109 S. Ct. 1514, 1517 (1989).
179 119 CONG. REC. 9602 (1973) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). Senator Kennedy was referring to
McCulloch v. Maiyland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), for the proposition that Congress has great
discretion in the Constitution's necessary and proper clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
180 See supra note 161. Defendants argued that 42 U.S.C. § 300 a-7(d) was the applicable section
protecting them from a court order to go against their consciences and institutional mission. It
reads:
No individual shall be required to perform or assist in the performance of any part of a
health service program or research activity funded in whole or in part under a program admin-
istered by the Secretary of Health and Human Services if his performance or assistance in
the performance of such part of such program or activity would be contrary to his religious
beliefs or moral convictions.
697 F. Supp. at 590 n.6 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 300 a-7(d)(1982)).
There is, however, nothing in this statutory language or the legislative history to preclude a
court from using this provision in a withdrawal of treatment situation. The 1974 amendment adding
provision (d) did not specifically refer to abortions and sterilization. During Senate debate on this
new conscience provision senators referred to protecting the medical profession as "increasing tech-
nology ... raises grave ethical and moral issues-issues affecting the future of all mankind." 120
CONG. REC. 21,539 (1974) (statement of Sen. Mondale). The 1974 amendment to this statute ad-
dressed biomedical research and advances. The language of the statute does not limit its applica-
tion. If this provision were intended to apply only in abortion and sterilization cases one would think
the provision's language would mirror that of the earlier provisions in 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7. See supra
note 161. Moreover, one would think that the Gray court would have dismissed the assertions that
the state and federal conscience clauses applied with one retort, namely, that both statutes only
applied to abortions and sterilizations. Instead, the court addressed each separately. It found the
state clause inapplicable because it clearly was limited to abortions and sterilizations. The court did
not apply the federal clause because Marcia Gray was not receiving care under a health service pro-
gram. 697 F. Supp. at 590 & n.6.
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NOTES
Although there are some state conscience clauses, not all include
procedures to remove hydration and nutrition.18 Moreover, comments
made on the Senate floor in the Church Amendment debate emphasize
how important such a conscience clause can be. First amendment rights,
such as the freedom to exercise one's religion, are at stake here. 8 2
The Gray court hinted that a conscience clause worded similarly to
the current federal conscience clause, arguably, could have protected the
defendants. 8 3 The court might have applied this specific legislation if
the Medical Center were receiving the stipulated federal funds. The only
reason the court articulated for not applying this legislation to Gray was
that Marcia was not receiving the applicable service. It did not say it
would only apply this language to abortion or sterilization cases.' 8 4
Some medical professionals opine that health care providers' moral
and ethical opinions deserve consideration but should remain secondary
to a patient's or his family's right to refuse life-sustaining treatment. 8 5
Others believe their rights cannot be so easily overlooked and are calling
for legislation in the aftermath of Gray. The Center for the Rights of the
Terminally Ill (CRTI) is one group calling for legislation. It adopted a
resolution that it hopes will prompt legislation. 186
This Note proposes draft legislation based on the CRTI's resolution
and the current federal abortion conscience clause cited above. 187 With
the caveat that congressional staff would have to change the language to
181 See supra note 49. See also Davis, Defining the Employment Rights of Medical Personnel within the
Parameters of Personal Conscience, 1986 DEr. C.L. REv. 847, 859-66 (1986). This article also discusses
various alternatives available to an employee if an employer discriminates against him for his beliefs.
182 See supra notes 148-154, 167-178 and accompanying text.
183 See supra note 104 & 180.
184 Id. See supra note 180.
185 Grimstad, Protecting the Rights of Conscience of Health Care Personnel, ALL ABOtrr ISSUES, Jan.
1990, at 14-15. The American Academy of Neurology issued a position paper in April of 1988 to
this effect. Id at 15. Grimstad, on the other hand, is calling for legislation to protect health care
personnel, especially since the Gray decision.
186 Id. In January 1989, the Center for the Rights of the Terminally Ill (CRTI) adopted "A
Resolution to Protect the Rights of Conscience of Health Care Personnel". Several hundred individ-
uals and institutions have signed it. Id It reads:
Whereas, the rights of health care personnel are to be respected;
Therefore, no professional health care provider, nor any employee or member of the staff
of any health care facility, nor any home health caregiver shall be required to perform or
participate in the performance of any act of omission or commission intended to hasten the
death of a patient, if such health care provider, employee, staffmember or caregiver objects
to such an act on personal, ethical, moral or religious grounds;
Therefore, any person making such a claim of conscience, or who states an intention to
make such a claim of conscience, shall not be denied employment, disciplined or discrimi-
nated against in any manner on account of his or her refusal to perform or participate in
any act of omission or commission for the purpose of causing or hastening the death of a
patient;
Further, no person shall, as a condition of training, employment, pay, promotion or privi-
leges, be required to agree to perform or participate in the performance of any act of omis-
sion or commission for the purpose of causing or hastening the death of a patient.
3 THE CENTER FOR THE RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL (CRTI) REPORT, No. 2 (Mar/Apr 1989).
187 This author assisted Charles Rice, Professor of Law at the University of Notre Dame, in draft-
ing some language for a federal conscience clause and acknowledges his generosity and guidance. If
this language were to be enacted, statutory definitions might need to be included. It is interesting to
note that there seems to be no universal or general definition for "hospital" or "medical facility" or
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clarify definitions and make adjustments to add it to other legislation, the
proposed language reads:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That:
(a) No court, nor public official, nor other public authority shall be
authorized to require:
(A) any individual to perform or assist in the performance of any
act of commission or omission which may cause or hasten the
death of a patient if his or her performance or assistance would be
contrary to his or her religious beliefs or moral convictions; or
(B) any health care facility to:
(1) make its facilities available for the performance of any act
of commission or omission which may cause or hasten the
death of a patient if such an act is prohibited by the entity on
the basis of religious beliefs or moral convictions, or
(2) provide any personnel for the performance or assistance
in the performance of an act of commission or omission which
may cause or hasten the death of a patient if the act or assist-
ance would be contrary to the religious beliefs or moral con-
victions of such personnel.
(b) Discrimination prohibition
No entity may:
(A) discriminate in the employment, promotion, or termination
of employment of any physician or other health care personnel, or
(B) discriminate in the extension of staff or other privileges to
any physician or other health care personnel, because he or she
refused to perform or assist in the performance of a lawful act of
commission or omission which may cause or hasten the death of a
patient on the grounds that his or her performance or assistance
would be contrary to his or her religious beliefs or moral
convictions.
(c) Individual rights respecting certain requirements contrary to reli-
gious beliefs or moral convictions.
No individual shall be required by any person to perform or assist in
the performance of any act of commission or omission which may
cause or hasten the death of a patient if his or her performance or
assistance would be contrary to his or her religious beliefs or moral
convictions.
There are at least two onerous problems with drafting legislation
aimed at protecting all medical personnel and at least private facilities.
"medical personnel". Each and every statute can and usually does have its own definition, making a
federal, government conscience clause difficult to enact.
Because of this problem, the language would need to be attached to appropriations or
reauthorization legislation. The first problem with that is that the legislation would only apply to
personnel and institutions falling under the particular program or funding apparatus, resulting in
disparate treatment. Why should different medical personnel be treated differently with regard to
their own constitutionally protected free exercise rights depending on whether the care they give is
somehow tied to federal funds? The second and related problem would be that the protection
would vary since piecemeal legislation is not likely to be uniform by the time it passes Congress.
Whether this language would protect state-run facilities depends partly on the Supreme Court's
decision in Cruzan. If it finds a constitutionally protected right to authorize withdrawing nutrition, it
may be that only private institutions would be protected by the provision regarding institutions.
However, in protecting these institutions, the aim is really to protect the individual. Protecting the
institutions where these individuals work is a way to fortify the individuals' protection.
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First, there are no uniform definitions for terms like "hospital" or "medi-
cal facility" that would help in drafting one conscience clause to cover all
private facilities and individual health care personnel. It appears then
that only piecemeal legislation can be enacted.'8 8 That presents the sec-
ond problem: some personnel go unprotected. This is inadequate since
this protection has constitutional underpinnings. Forcing someone to
remove a feeding tube could interfere with their exercise of religion.
Even if a person's objection is based on moral instead of religious convic-
tions, the Church Amendment debate illustrates how important it is to
protect moral convictions. 89
IV. Conclusion: Legislators Must Act to Protect
the Rights of Medical Personnel
In Gray, a federal court for the first time ordered a state-run hospital
to promptly transfer an incompetent patient in a persistent vegetative
state or remove her nutrition and hydration. Medical staff and the hospi-
tal's policies and mission opposed removing the tube. In the end, they
were able to transfer the patient, escaping the decision whether to diso-
bey a court order or their moral convictions.
Regardless of whether the Supreme Court finds a patient's constitu-
tional or common law right to authorize terminating nutrition and hydra-
tion, a court should have no authority to compel a person to either
disobey a court order to withdraw a feeding tube or act in direct conflict
with religious or moral convictions against these procedures. Such an
order violates a person's individual rights, most notably one's freedom of
religion.
During Senate floor debate on the abortion conscience clause, sena-
tors agreed that medical personnel needed legislative protection from
courts and other public authority ordering them to perform abortions.
Senator Kennedy stated that the Constitution empowered Congress to
"exempt individuals from any requirement that they perform medical
procedures that are objectionable to their religious convictions." 190 He
then cited Supreme Court cases supporting his argument that "in many
cases, the Constitution itself is sufficient to grant an exemption to protect
persons from official acts that infringe on their full exercise." 1 9' The
Senate debate also emphasized the importance of protecting convictions
based on moral, not necessarily religious principles. This Note contends
that medical personnel who might disobey such a court order for reli-
gious reasons could defend their actions by using the first amendment
exercise clause.
188 Telephone interviews with William Howard, United States Civil Rights Commission, Wash-
ington, D.C. (June and July, 1989); Joseph Pidgeoni, United States Department of Health and
Human Services, Washington, D.C. (June, 1989); and David Shaneyfelt, United States Department
ofJustice, Washington, D.C. (June and July, 1989). The author acknowledges their assistance re-
garding legislation drafting and notes that the views herein are of this author.
189 See supra notes 155-180 and accompanying text.
190 119 CONG. REC. 9602 (1973) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
191 l
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This Note likens the situation at hand with that left by Roe and Bolton
in 1973. The Supreme Court failed to fully address the moral and reli-
gious dilemma for health care providers opposing abortion or steriliza-
tion; Congress acted to protect them. While a conscience clause is in
place for medical personnel regarding the abortion and sterilization is-
sues, further action is necessary to afford similar protection in the eutha-
nasia area. If 42 U.S.C. 300 a-7(d) could be applied to euthanasia cases
(and it may be after the Gray court's footnote), the appropriate course of
action might be to enact that same language onto every applicable legis-
lation possible to expand its coverage to more facilities and individual
health care providers. If not, Congress must act as it did in 1973 and
coordinate efforts to "fortify freedom of religion as it relates to the im-
plementation of any and all Federal programs affecting medicine and
medical care."92
States must follow suit. State law also determines who is acting under
color of law. The federal conscience clause would not protect a facility
or its employees, if the facility were not receiving the stipulated federal
funds. Medical staff should never be considered, in a Gray situation, as
capable of violating a person's civil rights while only trying to exercise
their own constitutionally-based rights.
Irene Prior Loftus
192 119 CONG. REC. 9595 (1973) (emphasis added). See supra note 162.
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